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Abstract 
This paper illustrates why fiscal policy becomes more effective as unemployment rises in 
recessions.  The  theory  is  based  on  the  equilibrium  unemployment  model  of  Michaillat 
(forthcoming),  in  which  jobs  are  rationed  in  recessions.  Fiscal  policy  takes  the  form  of 
government spending on public-sector jobs. Recessions are periods of acute job shortage 
without much competition for workers among recruiting firms; hiring in the public sector 
does  not  crowd  out  hiring  in  the  private  sector  much;  therefore  fiscal  policy  reduces 
unemployment effectively. Formally the fiscal multiplier—the reduction in unemployment 
rate  achieved  by  spending  one  dollar  on  public-sector  jobs—is  countercyclical.  An 
implication is that available estimates of the fiscal multiplier, which measure the average 
effect  of  fiscal  policy  over  the  business  cycle,  do  not  apply  in  recessions  because  the 
multiplier is much higher in recessions than on average.  
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 P. Michaillat, submitted 2012 1 Introduction
Many economists and policymakers believe that ﬁscal policy may be especially effective to stim-
ulate the economy in recessions. Recent research substantiates this belief by showing that ﬁscal
policy may especially increase output during extraordinary recessions when the zero lower bound
on nominal interest rates binds [for example, Christiano et al., 2011; Eggertsson, 2011; Eggertsson
and Krugman, 2011]. This result surely applies to the US during the Great Depression and the
years following the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, when the nominal interest rate reached a near-zero value
regarded as effective lower bound. But we have no reason to believe that ﬁscal policy is particularly
effective otherwise, when the economy is in recession away from the zero lower bound.
This paper argues that the result from the zero-lower-bound research is in fact more general. It
shows that ﬁscal policy may be especially effective to stimulate the economy not just at the zero
lower bound, but at any time when the labor market is depressed. A ﬁscal policy that achieves
this property is public employment. I measure the effectiveness of public employment by a ﬁscal
multiplier—deﬁned as the reduction in unemployment rate achieved by spending one dollar on
public employment. I prove that the ﬁscal multiplier is countercyclical: the higher the unemploy-
ment rate, the more effective public employment, irrespective of the zero lower bound.
Byprovidingamodelinwhichtheﬁscalmultiplierismuchhigherinrecessionsthanonaverage,
this paper reinforces the argument in Parker [2011] that most available estimates of the ﬁscal
multiplier, obtained by averaging the effects of ﬁscal policy over the business cycle, cannot apply
in recessions. Parker [2011] points out that numerical and empirical methods used to estimate the
multiplier average the effects of ﬁscal policy over all states of the economy. He concludes that
these methods are inappropriate to describe the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy in recessions if ﬁscal
policy is more effective in recessions than on average. That is the case in my calibrated model: the
ﬁscal multiplier increases more than threefold when the unemployment rate rises from 4% to 10%.
The core of the analysis characterizes the ﬁscal multiplier in presence of job rationing—the
property that the labor market does not converge to full employment when matching frictions
are arbitrarily small, or equivalently when unemployed workers exert an arbitrarily large effort to
1search for jobs. The paper augments the equilibrium unemployment model of Michaillat [forth-
coming] with public employment. The model combines (a) equilibrium unemployment arising
from frictions in matching workers to ﬁrms as in Pissarides [2000]; (b) unemployment ﬂuctuations
arising from technology shocks and real wage rigidity as in Hall [2005]; (c) job rationing in reces-
sions resulting from the combination of wage rigidity and diminishing marginal returns to labor.
Public employment is ﬁnanced by a labor tax such that the government budget remains balanced
each period.
While public employment has been relatively neglected by a literature in which ﬁscal policy
typically consists of government purchase of consumption goods, it has been widely used in the
US (and elsewhere) to tackle unemployment in recessions.1 Statistically, public employment is
countercyclical: the correlation between public employment and the unemployment rate is 0.66
in the US for the 1970–2007 period [Gomes, 2010]. During the Great Depression the Roosevelt
administration hired millions of unemployed workers to build dams, bridges, and roads [Fishback
and Kachanovskaya, 2010; Fleck, 1999; Neumann et al., 2010]. More recently the American Jobs
Act presented by the Obama administration to Congress in 2011 proposed to spend $130 billion
to tackle high unemployment by hiring teachers, construction workers allocated to infrastructure
projects, and other public-sector workers.2 Indeed, public employment seems particularly adapted
to reduce unemployment in the short run.3
I present the basic framework in Section 2. Section 3 demonstrates that the sheer presence
of unemployment is not sufﬁcient to explain why ﬁscal policy is more effective in recessions.
The section consider two limit cases of the model in which there is no job rationing: a model with
constant marginal returns to labor and Nash bargaining, and a model with constant marginal returns
to labor and rigid wages. In these models, public employment crowds out private employment one-
1Previous literature on public employment includes Finn [1998] and Cavallo [2005], who study government pur-
chases of hours in the public sector in a standard real business cycle model. But these models do not have unemploy-
ment. Holmlund and Linden [1993], H¨ orner et al. [2007], Quadrini and Trigari [2007], Gomes [2010], and Burdett
[in press] to study the effects of public employment in an equilibrium unemployment model. But these models do not
isolate the effects of public employment in recessions.
2Details are provided at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-ofﬁce/2011/09/08/fact-sheet-american-jobs-act.
3See Pappa [2010] for empirical evidence that government spending on public employment is more effective than
government spending on investment or consumption goods.
2for-one and ﬁscal policy has no effect on aggregate employment.
In Section 4, I prove that the public-employment multiplier is positive in a model with job ra-
tioning. Next, I write the ﬁscal multiplier as a continuous function of the underlying state of the
economy and prove that the multiplier is countercyclical. The result hinges on the nature of unem-
ployment in times of trouble. While public employment mechanically increases aggregate labor
demand, it also crowds out private employment by making it more difﬁcult for ﬁrms to hire work-
ers. The crowding out of private employment partially offsets the increase in public employment.
The effectiveness of ﬁscal policy depends on the extent of crowding out. In recessions, crowding
out is weak: when jobs are rationed and unemployment is high, there is not much competition for
job applicants between ﬁrms and the government, so hiring in the public sector does not displace
hiring in the private sector much. Thus, ﬁscal policy is particularly effective.
Section 5 proposes three natural extensions of the basic model, and proves that the ﬁscal mul-
tiplier remains positive and countercyclical in these cases. The multiplier is actually larger in all
three extensions than in the basic model. In the ﬁrst extension, unemployed workers control their
future employment rate (their labor supply) by choosing how much to search for a job. Public
employment increases the return to job search by increasing the probability to ﬁnd a job. Thus,
public employment also stimulates labor supply. In the second extension, the output of the pub-
lic sector contributes to a stock of public capital, which in turn contributes to the productivity of
ﬁrms. Since public employment increases the marginal productivity of ﬁrms, it also stimulates the
demand for labor of ﬁrms. In the third extension, wages differ in the public and private sectors.
Unemployed workers direct their search to one of the two sectors, depending on the wage and
job-ﬁnding probability in each sector. If wages in the public sector are below those in the private
sector, the probability to ﬁnd a job is higher in the public sector, and creating public-sector jobs is
more effective because it attracts workers toward the sector with the highest job-ﬁnding rate.
Section 6 calibrates the model with US data to illustrate that the ﬂuctuations of the ﬁscal mul-
tiplier over the business cycle are sizable. The model is too simple to be the basis for quantitative
estimates of the effects of actual ﬁscal policy interventions. Nonetheless, the calibration illustrates
how much the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy varies over the business cycle, and how the effective-
3ness varies with some features of the policy, such as the level of wages in the public sector. In
the basic model and its extensions the ﬁscal multiplier is in the 0.6–1.4 range for the average US
unemployment rate of 6%, which means that spending 1% of GDP on ﬁscal policy reduces un-
employment by 0.6–1.4 percentage points on average. The multiplier ﬂuctuates signiﬁcantly over
the business cycle. It increases nearly fourfold when the unemployment rate increases from 4% to
10%: for instance in the basic model, the multiplier increases from 0.27 to 1.15.
By theoretically characterizing the effects of ﬁscal policy over the business cycle, the model
illustrates why ﬁscal policy may be more desirable in times of trouble. The ﬁscal multiplier in a
stochastic dynamic model is usually calculated by log-linearizing the system of equilibrium rela-
tionships around the deterministic steady state, as in Woodford [2011]. By construction the ﬁscal
multiplier is valid only around the steady state. The multiplier cannot be a function of the state
of the economy and cannot be valid in recessions, which are some distance away from the steady
state. To circumvent these difﬁculties, I use a deterministic dynamic model, calculate ﬁscal multi-
pliers in the nonlinear model by comparative statics, and compare ﬁscal multipliers across steady
states with different unemployment rates. I am also able to represent a steady-state equilibrium
diagrammatically to depict the mechanisms at play. The model, however, falls short of providing
estimates of the ﬁscal multiplier in a stochastic environment. Section 7 concludes by discussing
such shortcomings of the theory and possible resolutions. Proofs are collected in the Appendix.
2 The Model
A technology parameter a captures the position of the economy in the business cycle. To strip the
model to its essence, I abstract from workers’ choice of labor supply, from public capital, and from
the existence of two separate labor markets for public jobs and private jobs. These extensions will
be introduced in Section 5.
Labor market. There is a unit mass of workers in the labor market. Two sectors compose the
labor market: a private sector with lt workers, and a public sector with gt workers. Aggregate
4employment is nt = lt +gt. At the end of period t  1, a fraction s of the nt 1 existing worker-job
matches is exogenously destroyed. Workers who lose their job apply for a new job immediately. At
the beginning of period t, ut = 1 (1 s)nt 1 unemployed workers search for a job. Jobseekers
apply to jobs randomly: they do not direct their search toward private or public jobs.Those who
ﬁnd a job participate in production in period t with the (1 s)nt 1 incumbent workers.
By posting vacancies, ﬁrms hire workers in the private sector and the government hires workers
in the public sector. The number ht of matches made in a period is given by a Cobb-Douglas





ht  minfut;otg. wh > 0 and h 2 (0;1) are parameters. Labor market conditions are summarized
by labor market tightness qt  ot=ut. The matching technology prevents all unemployed workers
from ﬁnding a job and all vacancies from being ﬁlled. Jobseekers ﬁnd a job with probability
f(qt) = whq
1 h
t . Vacancies in the public and private sectors are ﬁlled with the same probability
q(qt) = wh q
 h
t . In a tight market it is easy to ﬁnd jobs—the job-ﬁnding probability f(qt) is
high—but difﬁcult to ﬁnd workers—the vacancy-ﬁlling probability q(qt) is low.
Keeping a vacancy open has a per-period cost ra in units of private good, where r > 0 captures
resources spent recruiting workers.4 A worker is hired with certainty by opening 1=q(qt) vacancies
and spending ra=q(qt).
Firm. A representative ﬁrm produces a private good sold to workers taking the price (normalized
to 1) as given. The ﬁrm’s production function is
yt = ax(lt); (1)
where yt is output of private good, a is technology level, lt is employment in the ﬁrm, x(l)=la, and
a > 0 is a parameter. A risk-neutral entrepreneur, with the same discount factor d < 1 as workers,
owns the ﬁrm. Given wage and tightness fwt;qtg
+¥
t=0, the ﬁrm’s problem is to choose employment
4As in Pissarides [2000] the cost of opening a vacancy is proportional to technology a. This is equivalent to
assuming that the recruiting technology itself is independent of technology, but that it uses labor as unique input
[Shimer, 2010]. This assumption is appealing since recruiting is a time-intensive activity.
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+¥
t=0 to maximize present discounted proﬁts å
+¥
t=0dt Pt, where the proﬁt in period t is given by




lt  (1 s)lt 1  0 is the number of hires in period t. In steady state the ﬁrst-order condition with








Firms hire labor until until marginal product of labor ax0(l) equals marginal cost of labor, which
is the sum of the wage w plus the amortized hiring cost [1 d(1 s)]ra=q(q).
Workers. Workers have separable utility over consumption ct of private good (produced in the
private sector) and consumption pt of public good (produced in the public sector) of the form






t = bt wt when unemployed. The replacement rate r  cu
t =ce
t = bt=(1 tt), which measures
the generosity of the unemployment insurance (UI) system, is assumed to remain constant.
Unlike the standard macroeconomic literature, but in line with the equilibrium unemployment
literature, I abstract from changes in the number of hours worked by employed workers. This
choice is consistent with the empirical evidence that most cyclical variations in total hours worked
are due to variations in the number of employed workers and not to variations in hours per worker
[Shimer, 2010]. Instead, I focus on changes in workers’ employment rate. In steady state the
inﬂow to unemployment sn must equal the outﬂow from unemployment [1 (1 s)n] f(q).





6If ﬁrms post more vacancies, tightness q and job-ﬁnding probability f(q) increase, which raises
employment rate n.
Government. The government’s production function is:
pt = wpax(gt): (4)
gt is public employment, pt is the output of public good, which is consumed by workers, and wp
is a parameter that scales the productivity of the public sector relative to that of the private sector.
The government has two sources of expenditure: (a) it employs gt workers in the public sector
at the prevailing private-sector wage wt; and (b) it provides unemployment beneﬁts bt wt to all
unemployed workers. Government spending is ﬁnanced by a labor tax tt paid by all employees,
and by the ﬁrm’s proﬁt Pt, which is entirely taxed by the government. In the absence of saving and
borrowing the resource constraint imposes that the government’s budget be balanced each period:











which says that all private output must be either consumed or used as a resource for recruiting.
Since the government’s budget remains balanced each period, the ﬁscal multiplier analyzed in
the paper is a balanced-budget multiplier. The balanced-budget multiplier is particularly relevant
for two reasons. First, exploding public debt in most developed countries seems to call for ﬁscal
restraint, making the use of deﬁcit ﬁnancing less desirable. Second, from an historical perspective,
governments have not always resorted to deﬁcit ﬁnancing in recessions. In the 1930s the Hoover
and Roosevelt administrations ﬁnanced most of the increases in federal spending with taxes and
5The government’s budget constraint is written as the resource constraint using the deﬁnition of the ﬁrm’s proﬁt.
7ran relatively small deﬁcits [Fishback and Kachanovskaya, 2010].
Wage. The wage in the private sector is set once worker and ﬁrm have matched. Since search
costs are sunk at the time of matching, there are always mutual gains from trade. There is no
compelling theory of wage determination in such an environment [Hall, 2005]. Hence I assume
that the private-sector wage follows the simple wage schedule from Blanchard and Gal´ ı [2010]:
wt = wag: (6)
w > 0 is a parameter. The parameter g captures the ﬂexibility of wages over the business cycle. If
g = 0, wages are completely ﬁxed over the cycle. If g = 1, wages are proportional to technology
and fully ﬂexible over the cycle. To simplify I assume that the wage is constant over time. This
assumption is innocuous since the analysis focuses on the steady state of the economy.
It becomes clear in Section 4 that any wage (6) is privately efﬁcient in a deterministic environ-
ment as long as the initial values of employments l0 and g0 are close enough to their steady-state
values. Private efﬁciency guarantees that worker-ﬁrm pairs exploit all opportunities for mutual
improvement, such that the wage never causes the destruction of a match generating a positive
bilateral surplus. Private efﬁciency is a reasonable equilibrium requirement when rational workers
and ﬁrms engage in long-term interactions [Barro, 1977].6
Steady-state equilibrium. In a steady state parameterized by technology a, given public em-
ployment g and replacement rate r, the equilibrium is characterized by eleven variables: wage w,
private output y, public output p, aggregate employment n, unemployment u, private employment
l, labor market tightness q, consumption of employed workers ce, consumption of unemployed
workers cu, labor tax rate t, and unemployment beneﬁt rate b. The eleven variables are determined
by eleven relationships: wage schedule (6); production functions (1) and (4); accounting identities
n = l +g and u = 1 (1 s)n; Beveridge curve (3); ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (2);
6In a stochastic environment, private efﬁciency may not be respected after large negative technology shock. But
under a condition on the standard deviation of technology shocks and the wage ﬂexibility g, private efﬁciency holds
with high enough probability [Michaillat, forthcoming].
8resource constraint (5) and replacement rate deﬁnition r = cu=ce; budget constraints of employed
and unemployed workers: ce = (1 t)w and cu = bw. The government’s budget constraint is
redundant once workers’ budget constraints and the resource constraint are accounted for.
Efﬁcient allocation. The efﬁcient allocation solves the problem of a benevolent planner who
faces the technological constraints and labor market frictions present in the economy. Proposi-
tion A1 in the Appendix proves that in the efﬁcient allocation, labor market variables (labor mar-
ket tightness, public and private employment) are independent of technology a. When technology
falls, productivities in the private and public sectors as well as recruiting costs all fall in concert.
Thus the trade-offs between productions in the private and public sector and between production
and job search are unaffected by technology ﬂuctuations. As a result it is socially optimal to sta-
bilize labor market variables completely, irrespective of the technology level.7 In other words,
unemployment spikes during recessions are socially inefﬁcient. In response, the government uses
ﬁscal policy in the form public employment to reduce unemployment.
3 Zero Fiscal Multiplier in the Absence of Job Rationing
The next sections characterize the ﬁscal multiplier in the presence of job rationing—the property
that the labor market does not converge to full employment when matching frictions are arbitrarily
small. Before presenting the core of the analysis, this section argues that in the absence of job
rationing, the sheer presence of unemployment does not explain why ﬁscal policy is particularly
effective in recessions. To illustrate this point, I conﬁne my analysis to a relatively special case of
theequilibriumunemploymentmodelthatsharesthemainfeaturesofthePissarides[2000]model.8
In this model public employment necessarily crowds out private employment one-for-one, whether
wages are perfectly ﬂexible or somewhat rigid. Fiscal policy cannot stimulate employment and the
7Thisresultisnotnewtotheliterature. BlanchardandGal´ ı[2010]showsthatinanew-Keynesianmodelaugmented
with matching frictions in the labor market, the efﬁcient allocation implies a constant unemployment rate over the
business cycle. Shimer [2010] ﬁnds the same result in a neoclassical model augmented with matching frictions.
8Michaillat [forthcoming] proves that in the canonical equilibrium unemployment model of Pissarides [2000] and
in the variant with rigid wages of Hall [2005], there is no job rationing.
9ﬁscal multiplier is zero.
ASSUMPTION 1. The production function has constant marginal returns to labor: a = 1.
ASSUMPTION 2. The wage wt is determined by generalized Nash bargaining in any period t.
Worker’s bargaining power is c 2 (0;1).
These two assumptions capture the main features of the equilibrium unemployment model in
Pissarides [2000]. The generalized Nash bargaining solution allocates a fraction c of the match
surplus to the worker and the rest to the ﬁrm. Lemma 1 characterizes the outcome of bargaining:

































In steady state the Nash-bargained wage is proportional to technology (g = 1). Therefore the
equilibrium system of two equations f(3), (7)g and two variables fn;qg is independent of technol-
ogy. Fluctuations in technology do not lead to any ﬂuctuations in labor market variables because
the equilibrium wage is fully ﬂexible.9 Since the unemployment rate remains constant when tech-
nology ﬂuctuates, there are no proper recessions in this model.
Eventhoughtherearenorecessions, therateofunemploymentisnotnecessarilylow: ifworkers
have strong bargaining power, the unemployment rate could be high. In that case the government
may want to reduce unemployment through public employment. Is that feasible? No it is not. The
9Whentechnologyfalls, marginalproductoflabor, wage, andrecruitingcostfallinproportion. Marginalproductof
labor and marginal cost of labor move in proportion with technology. Therefore the proﬁt-maximizing level of private
employment is invariant to technology: technology a drops out of equation (2). The wage moves in proportion to
technology because the recruiting cost (which determines the outside option of the ﬁrm in bargaining) is proportional
to technology and unemployment beneﬁts (which determine the outside option of the worker in bargaining) are a
constant fraction r of the post-tax wage. In slightly different models, Blanchard and Gal´ ı [2010] and Shimer [2010]
also show that the unemployment rate is invariant to technology when wages are determined by Nash bargaining.
10equilibrium system of two equations f(3), (7)g and two variables fn;qg is also independent of pub-
lic employment g. Therefore public employment has no effect on aggregate employment. When
public employment increases, it reduces private employment by the same amount and aggregate
employment is unchanged: the ﬁscal multiplier is zero. Public jobs replace private jobs one-for-
one with public jobs because aggregate employment is solely a function of tightness through the
Beveridge curve (3), and tightness is solely a function of model parameters through (7), unaffected
by public employment.
In fact the ﬁscal multiplier remains zero even if I replace the Nash-bargained wage of As-
sumption 2 by a rigid wage that satisﬁes the schedule (6) with g < 1. The model with a rigid
wage generates employment ﬂuctuations when technology ﬂuctuates.10 But the equilibrium sys-
tem remains independent of public employment. Therefore public employment cannot stimulate
aggregate employment: the ﬁscal multiplier remains zero.
The result that public employment cannot stimulate aggregate employment is obviously a spe-
cial one, arising in presence of a number of simplifying assumptions. For instance the result would
no longer hold if public-sector workers produced public capital contributing to ﬁrm’s productiv-
ity. Nevertheless, this section illustrates that ﬁscal policy is not necessarily effective in a model of
equilibrium unemployment, even when unemployment is inefﬁciently high.
4 Fiscal Multiplier in the Presence of Job Rationing
In the models studied in the previous section, ﬁscal policy is ineffective. These models, however,
do not provide a good description of recessionary unemployment. As argued by [Michaillat, forth-
coming], these models converge to full employment when matching frictions are arbitrarily small.
This property is at odds with the long queues of jobseekers observed in front of factory gates dur-
ing the Great Depression. This section proposes a better model of recessions and shows that in
this better model, ﬁscal policy does reduce unemployment. Following Michaillat [forthcoming], I
10The equilibrium system depends on technology a because w=a = wag 1 in equation (2). When technology falls
the normalized wage w=a increases and private employment falls.
11make two assumptions on the production function and wage schedule faced by ﬁrms:
ASSUMPTION 3. The production function has diminishing marginal returns to labor: a < 1.
ASSUMPTION 4. The wage schedule is somewhat rigid: g < 1.
Under these assumptions, the model captures two key properties of recessions: (a) unemploy-
ment is higher in recessions; and (b) jobs are rationed in recessions, as some unemployment re-
mains even if matching frictions vanish. Assumption 3 is motivated by the observation that at
business cycle frequency, some production inputs adjust slowly. Assumption 4 is motivated by his-
torical, ethnographic, and empirical studies that document and explain the sources of wage rigidity
[for example, Bewley, 1999; Jacoby, 1984; Kahn, 1997; O’Brien, 1989].
I measure the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy with a ﬁscal multiplier, deﬁned as the reduction in
unemployment achieved by spending one unit of private good on public employment. I study the
ﬁscal multiplier in two steps. In the ﬁrst part of the section, I represent the steady-state equilib-
rium with a labor demand-labor supply diagram in a price q-quantity n plan. This representation
provides graphical intuition for the behavior of the model over the business cycle and the impact
of ﬁscal policy. It also simpliﬁes the theoretical characterization of the sign and cyclicality of the
ﬁscal multiplier, in the second part of the section.
To represent the equilibrium in a labor demand-labor supply diagram, I need to modify the
conventional deﬁnition of labor supply. In standard macroeconomic models, labor supply desig-
nates the number of hours of work that a worker supplies given economic conditions. But in this
model the number of hours worked per worker is ﬁxed. Instead, I use labor supply to designate
the employment rate of a worker given labor market conditions. I deﬁne labor supply ns(q) as
the employment rate that satisﬁes the Beveridge curve (3) for a given tightness q. Labor sup-
ply ns(q) increases with q, because the job-ﬁnding probability f(q) increases with q. I deﬁne
the private labor demand ld(q;a) as the private-sector employment rate that satisﬁes the ﬁrm’s
proﬁt-maximization condition (2). Assumption 3 implies that ld(q;a) is a well-deﬁned, decreasing
function of q because the marginal product of labor x0(l) decreases with l and the vacancy-ﬁlling
probability q(q) decreases with q. When the labor market is slack, it is cheap for ﬁrms to recruit,
12stimulating hiring. Assumption 4 implies that ld(q;a) is a decreasing function of technology a
because the normalized wage w=a = wag 1 decreases with a. When technology is low, wages are
relatively high, depressing hiring. Aggregate labor demand is the sum of public and private labor
demands:
nd(q;a;g) = g+ld(q;a): (8)
In presence of matching frictions, the wage itself is exogenous and cannot equalize labor supply
and labor demand. Instead, tightness q acts as a price equilibrating labor supply and labor demand:
ns(q) = nd(q;a;g): (9)
Equation (9) implicitly deﬁnes equilibrium tightness q. As technology a decreases, q decreases
because labor demand nd(q;a;g) is lower for all q. Equilibrium employment n can be directly read
off the labor demand curve:
n = nd(q;a;g); (10)
where equilibrium labor market tightness q satisﬁes (9). As technology a decreases, n decreases.
Figure 1 depicts the equilibrium for high (left panel) and low (right panel) technology in a price
q-quantity n diagram. Equilibrium employment n and equilibrium tightness q are given by the
intersection of the downward-sloping labor demand curve with the upward-sloping labor supply
curve. In a recession technology decreases and labor demand shifts inwards. The new equilibrium
has lower aggregate and private employment, lower tightness, and higher unemployment. Labor
market tightness equalizes labor supply and labor demand. While tightness acts as a price, it is
not a price and the usual adjustment to reach equilibrium through bidding does not apply. Instead
the adjustment to reach the labor market equilibrium is achieved through vacancy posting. For
instance if labor demand is above labor supply at the current tightness, the number of vacancies
posted by ﬁrms is not sufﬁcient to hire the desired number of workers. Consequently ﬁrms post
more vacancies to hire more workers. But, while more vacancies generate from matches and allow
ﬁrms to hire more workers, they also increase labor market tightness. This increase reduces the
probability to ﬁll each vacancy and augments hiring costs. Higher hiring costs imply a higher
13marginal cost of labor, reducing ﬁrms’ demand for labor. To summarize, ﬁrms increase labor
market tightness and reduce the gap between labor supply and labor demand by posting more
vacancies. This adjustment mechanism operates until the labor market equilibrium is reached. At
this point tightness equalizes labor demand and labor supply. As I discuss the tightness adjustments
necessary to reach equilibrium in the text, the reader must be aware that vacancy posting is the
actual mechanism equalizing demand and supply in the labor market.
Figure 1 also illustrates job rationing. After a negative technology shock the marginal product
of labor falls but the rigid wage adjusts downward only partially, so private labor demand shifts
inward (left to right panel). If the adverse shock is large enough the marginal product of the last
workers in the labor force, who are least productive due to diminishing marginal returns to labor,
falls below the wage. It becomes unproﬁtable for ﬁrms to hire these workers even if recruiting
is costless at q = 0 because the labor demand curve cuts the x-axis at nR < 1. Jobs are therefore
rationed: the labor market fails to clear and some unemployment remains even when matching
frictions vanish.11 The private efﬁciency of existing worker-ﬁrm matches, however, is always
respected. This is because the wage is always below the marginal product of employed workers;
otherwise the ﬁrm would not hire them. On the other hand, the wage is above the marginal product
of the least productive workers. But the ﬁrm never offers a job to these unproductive workers, who
are never matched with the ﬁrm.
The ﬁscal multiplier l is the marginal increase in aggregate employment achieved by spending








where mc = w+[1 d(1 s)]ra=q(q) is the per-period marginal cost of public employment.
What is the size of the ﬁscal multiplier when technology varies over the business cycle ? The
answer does not solely depend on the structure of the model. I must also specify the level of public
employment associated with each technology level. One should aim to characterize the effects of a
marginal increase in public employment over the business cycle, leaving public employment policy














































































Figure 1: Steady-state equilibrium in a price q-quantity n diagram
unchanged. But one must specify what exactly is assumed to be unchanged. Below I consider a
policy experiment in which the share of public employment in total employment is unchanged over
the business cycle.
ASSUMPTION 5. For any technology level a, the government sets g = zn, where n is equilib-
rium employment and z 2 (0;1).
Under Assumption 5, ﬁscal multiplier and comparative statics with respect to a are simple to
calculate. Proposition 1 establishes a few properties of the ﬁscal multiplier l:
PROPOSITION 1 (Multiplier in the basic model).
(a) ¶n=¶g < 1. Under Assumption 3, ¶n=¶g > 0 such that l > 0.
(b) Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, d[¶n=¶g]=da < 0 such that dl=da < 0.
Part (a) shows that the change in aggregate employment dn following a marginal increase in
public employment dg > 0 is necessarily less than dg, but is positive under Assumption 3. This
result is illustrated in Figure 2. The government decides to recruit dg>0 additional workers. In the
ﬁgure, the labor demand curve shifts right by dnd = dg > 0. At the current tightness, the level of
labor supply is below the new level of labor demand. To reach the new equilibrium, tightness must
15increase by dq > 0. Effectively ﬁrms face more competition in recruiting because the government
recruits from the same pool of unemployed workers as them. At this higher tightness, ﬁrms face a
lower vacancy-ﬁlling probability, a higher hiring cost, and a higher marginal cost of labor, which




dq < 0. This reduction is illustrated by a
movement to the left along the demand curve. That is, public employment necessarily crowds
out private employment because dn = dl +dg < dg. Under Assumption 3, however, public jobs
crowd out private jobs strictly less than one-for-one and dn = dg+dl > 0. This is because if
public jobs crowded out private jobs one-for-one, the new equilibrium would have the same labor
market tightness q but lower private employment l. The marginal cost of labor w+[1 d(1 s)]
(ra)=q(q) would remain constant, but the marginal product of labor ax0(l) would be higher by
diminishing marginal returns to labor. Hence the marginal product of labor would be above the
marginal cost of labor, violating the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximizing condition (2).
While Part (a) shows that the ﬁscal multiplier l is always positive, Part (b) shows that the
multiplier is high in recessions when technology a is low and unemployment is high, and that it
is low in expansions when technology is high and unemployment is low. That is, ﬁscal policy is
especially effective to reduce unemployment when the labor market is depressed. This property
arises mostly from the crowding-out of private employment by public employment being weaker
in recessions.12 This result is illustrated by comparing left (an expansion) and right (a recession)
panelsinFigure2. UnderAssumption4, privateandaggregatelabordemandsfallwhentechnology
falls because wages are somewhat rigid. The labor demand curve shifts left. Equilibrium labor
market tightness and employment are lower in recession. What is the effect of public hiring in
recession? Since the matching process is congested by the high volume of unemployment, each
vacancy posted is ﬁlled with high probability. The government only needs to open a few additional
vacancies to hire dg additional workers, barely rising tightness. The equilibrium increase dq>0 in




dq < 0 imposed
by the increase in public employment is small. That is, hiring in the public sector does not displace
hiring in the private sector much in recessions.
12The small decrease of the marginal cost of labor mc in recessions—because wage and hiring cost both fall—also
contributes to the increase of the multiplier.
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Figure 2: Effect of ﬁscal stimulus in the form of a marginal increase in public employment
The proof of the proposition is relegated to the Appendix, but I provide a sketch here. The
core of the proof characterizes the marginal effect ¶n=¶g of public employment g on aggregate







> 0 of labor supply and labor demand. ed is normalized to be positive. First, I express






















1. This factor captures the reduction dl in private employment caused by the equilibrium increase
dq in labor market tightness. The magnitude of the reduction depends on the elasticities es and ed
because they characterize the slopes of the labor demand and labor supply curves in Figure 2. As
es > 0 and ed > 0, ¶n=¶g 2 (0;1). Second, I determine how ¶nd=¶g, es, and ed vary over the cycle.
From (8), ¶nd=¶g = 1, so the shift of labor demand is constant over the cycle. The proof shows
that (a) es is countercyclical because it moves in proportion with unemployment u; and (b) ed is
procyclical because it moves in proportion with the share of the hiring cost in the marginal cost of
17labor (in recessions, this share is small because it is easy to hire workers). Hence es=ed as well as
¶n=¶g are countercylical.13
5 Extensions
In this section, I extend the model in three directions and examine how these extensions affect
the ﬁscal multiplier. First, I allow workers to adjust their labor supply to labor market conditions.
Second, I assume that the output of the public sector contributes to a stock of public capital that
enters the production function of ﬁrms. Third, I allow the government to set a public-sector wage
different from the private-sector wage.
5.1 Endogenous labor supply
In the basic model, workers have no control over their employment rate, which is determined by
the separation rate s and the job-ﬁnding rate f(q)—both exogenous to the worker—through the
Beveridge curve (3). But in practice people do have some control over their employment rate. For
instance when unemployment beneﬁts become less generous, unemployed workers search more
intensively to ﬁnd a job more rapidly.14 It is possible that ﬁscal policy, by creating new jobs in the
public sector and improving the prospects of jobseekers, stimulates labor supply.
To account for a possible response of labor supply to ﬁscal policy, I give workers control over
their future employment rate through the choice of a job-search effort et.15 At the beginning of
period t, unemployed workers search for a job with effort et and incur a utility cost z(et) = wz 
e1+k
t =(1+k), where wz >0, and k>0 are parameters. The number of matches is a Cobb-Douglas




13The results from Section 3 also derive from (11). Under Assumption 1, private and aggregate labor demands ld
and nd are perfectly elastic: ed = +¥. Formula (11) implies that ¶n=¶g = 0. In Figure 2, labor demand is horizontal.
14See Krueger and Meyer [2002] for an overview of the response of labor supply to unemployment insurance.
15The model with endogenous job-search effort closely follows Landais et al. [2010]. Alternatively, other papers
give households control over their future employment rate through the allocation of non-employed workers between
unemployment, which allows workers to ﬁnd jobs, and inactivity out of the labor force, which provides leisure [for ex-
ample, Bruckner and Pappa, forthcoming; Krusell et al., 2011; Shimer, 2011]. Both approaches are broadly equivalent
for the task at hand.
18redeﬁne labor market tightness as qt  ot=(et ut). f(qt) becomes the job-ﬁnding probability per
unit of effort. That is, a jobseeker searching with effort et ﬁnds a job with probability et  f(qt).
q(qt) remains the vacancy-ﬁlling probability.
Given labor tax rate, unemployment beneﬁt rate, wage, and tightness ftt;bt;wt;qtg
+¥
t=0, the
worker’s problem is to choose search effort fetg
+¥
















subject to the law of motion of the probability ns









I simplify derivations by assuming that the coefﬁcient of relative risk aversion n = 1. In steady










r = b=(1 t) is the replacement rate of the UI system.16 This equation implicitly deﬁnes the
supply of search effort es(q) as an increasing function of labor market tightness q.
The mechanism through which public employment reduces unemployment is almost identical
to that in the basic model. The recruitment of dg > 0 additional workers by the government leads
to an increase dq > 0 of labor market tightness. The only difference is that this increase raises not
only the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(q), but also unemployed workers’ search effort es(q).
For a given dq>0, the search effort increase de>0 also contributes to the increase in labor supply.
This effect appears transparently when I compute labor supply. Using the equality of ﬂows into
16Unemployment beneﬁt rate b and labor tax rate t do not matter: the utility gap between employment and un-
employment is solely determined by replacement rate r. Therefore the government can levy any amount of revenue
without affecting search effort by reducing beneﬁts, increasing taxes, while keeping the ratio r = b=(1 t) constant.
That is why I do not worry about the government’s budget constraint when I study different policy interventions.





Labor supply ns(q) is the employment rate chosen by jobseekers through their choice of search
effort, for a given tightness q. ns(q) increases with q, because both the supply of effort es(q) and
the per-unit job-ﬁnding probability f(q) increase with q. In ﬁgure 2, the labor supply would be
steeper. Equivalently, the elasticity es of labor supply with respect to tightness would be larger. The
only consequence is that a smaller increase dq > 0 is required to re-establish equilibrium after the




dq < 0 of private
employment is bound to be smaller. The adjustment in search effort notwithstanding, Proposition 2
establishes that the properties derived in the basic model obtain:
PROPOSITION 2 (Multiplier with endogenous labor supply). Assume that n = 1.
(a) ¶n=¶g < 1. Under Assumption 3, ¶n=¶g > 0 such that l > 0.
(b) Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, d[¶n=¶g]=da < 0 such that dl=da < 0.
The proof of the proposition is almost identical to that of Proposition 1. The only difference is
thattheelasticityes, whichalsoaccountsfortheresponseofsearchefforttoachangeintightness, is
no longer proportional to unemployment. But it remains procyclical and the proof carries through.
5.2 Public capital
In the basic model, the public good produced by public employment is consumed by workers. But
in practice public employment may improve institutions or infrastructure, which in turn improve
the productivity of ﬁrms. In fact, ﬁscal policy in the form of public employment often aims to
improve infrastructure. That was the case with the New Deal under the Roosevelt administration.
This is the case with the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, which includes $44
billion for infrastructure expenditures on water quality, transportation, or housing, and $88 billion
in federal spending on energy, innovative technology, or federal buildings [Leeper et al., 2010].
20Public capital represents institutions or infrastructure. I follow Baxter and King [1993] to model
public capital. I assume that in period t, public-sector workers produce a public good pt that is
invested in public capital kt+1. The production function of public capital is
kt+1 = (1 b)kt + pt:
b is the capital depreciation rate. The ﬁrm’s production function takes as argument private em-




a is technology, yt is output of private good, x(l) = la, and a 2 (0;1) is a parameter. x > 0 is
the elasticity of output with respect to public capital, which indicates the productiveness of public
capital. To simplify the analysis I assume that public capital does not enter the production function
of public good, which remains (4).
The mechanism through which public employment reduces unemployment is almost identical
to that in the basic model. The only difference is that the recruitment of dg > 0 additional workers
by the government leads not only to a mechanical increase in aggregate labor demand but also to
an increase in private labor demand because ﬁrm’s productivity is enhanced by the higher level of
public capital. In steady state public capital k remains constant over time so bk = p. Therefore





The ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (2) is modiﬁed because its production function depends













Private labor demand ld(q;a;g) increases with public employment g because the production func-
tion x(g) increases with g whereas the marginal productivity x0(l) decreases with l. In ﬁgure 2,
21the shift of the labor demand curve following an increase in public employment (a ﬁscal stimulus)
would be larger. The response of private labor demand notwithstanding, Proposition 3 establishes
that the properties of the ﬁscal multiplier derived in the basic model obtain:
PROPOSITION 3 (Multiplier with public capital).
(a) ¶n=¶g < 1+x[a=(1 a)][(1 z)=z]. Under Assumption 3, ¶n=¶g > 0 such that l > 0.
(b) Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, d[¶n=¶g]=da < 0 such that dl=da < 0.
The proof of the proposition is almost identical to that of Proposition 1. The only difference
is that the direct effect of public employment on labor demand ¶nd=¶g 6= 1. Increasing public
employment increases steady-state public capital, ﬁrm’s marginal productivity, and ﬁrm’s labor










But the direct effect ¶nd=¶g remains a constant, and the proof carries through.
5.3 Public-sector wages
In the basic model, public-sector wages equal private-sector wages. But in practice, these wages
maydiffer. Onaveragepublic-sectorjobsenjoyawagepremiumcomparedtoprivate-sectorjobs.17
Public-sector jobs created in recessions as part of a countercyclical ﬁscal policy could have wages
below those of private-sector jobs. For example during the New Deal, relief work programs—
administered ﬁrst by the Federal Emergency Relief Administration (FERA) from 1933–1935, then
bytheWorksProgressAdministration(WPA)establishedin1935—paidsubstantiallylowerhourly
wage than private-sector jobs [Margo, 1991; Neumann et al., 2010].
I allow the public-sector wage w
g
t to differ from the private-sector wage wt: w
g
t = pt wt, where
the public-wage premium pt may not be one. If pt <1, the public-sector wage is below the private-
17See Gregory and Borland [1999] for an overview of empirical evidence on the public-sector wage premium.
22sector wage, as in the work relief programs of the New Deal. To simplify, all unemployed workers
receive the same unemployment beneﬁts bt wt.
Since wages differ across sectors, unemployed workers direct their search either to the private
sector or to the public sector, as in Quadrini and Trigari [2007] and Gomes [2010]. Their choice
depends on the job-ﬁnding probability and wage in each sector. Let st be the share of unemployed
workers searching in the public sector. Let q
g
t be the labor market tightness in the public sector,
and qt the labor market tightness in the private sector. The government attracts jobseekers to the
public sector by choosing the public-wage premium pt. To simplify derivations, I assume that pt is
chosen such that the ratio of job-ﬁnding probabilities y  f(q
g
t )=f(qt) be constant at any time and
for any technology level. In a steady state equilibrium the optimal search behavior of unemployed
workers across labor markets creates a relationship between y and p, and the Appendix shows how
to recover p from a choice of y. In particular, p < 1 if and only if y > 1: it takes longer to ﬁnd
jobs in the private sector when private-sector jobs are more attractive.
When labor markets are in steady state:
su f(qg) = sg (17)
(1 s)u f(q) = sl: (18)
su is the number of unemployed workers searching in the public sector, and f(qg) is their prob-
ability to ﬁnd a job, so sucot f(qg) is the number of unemployed workers who ﬁnd a job in the
public sector each period. sg is the number of public-sector jobs destroyed each period. The ﬁrst
equation says that in steady state, ﬂows into and out of public employment balance each other. The
second equation is the same condition for private employment. Taking the ratio of (17) and (18)





Summing equations (17) and (18) and recombining them, I can express labor supply ns(q;s) as






ns(q;s) gives workers’ employment rate when unemployed workers search optimally across the
public and private sectors, for a given tightness q in the private sector. Labor supply ns(q;s)
increases with q and, when the ratio y > 1, with s. When y > 1, the job-ﬁnding rate is higher in
the public sector than in the private sector. When the share s of unemployed workers searching the
public sector increases, the number of unemployed workers ﬁnding a job each period mechanically
increases because it is faster to ﬁnd a job in the public sector. Thus the employment rate increases.
In spite of the presence of two distinct labor markets, the structure of the equilibrium is quite
similar to that in the basic model. The main difference is that that there is one additional equilib-
rium variable—the share s of unemployed workers searching the public sector—accompanied by
one additional equilibrium relationship. Given technology a, public employment g, and ratio y,
the equilibrium is described by three variables: aggregate employment n, labor market tightness in
the private sector q, and s. These variables are determined by three relationships: (19) (replace l by
n g), (10), and the equilibrium condition ns(q;s) = nd(q;a;g). The mechanism through which
public employment reduces unemployment can be represented with a diagram similar to those in
Figure 2. The government aims to recruit dg > 0 additional workers, which shifts the labor de-
mand curve to the right by dnd =dg>0. There is an additional effect: newly created public-sector
jobs attract jobseekers towards the public sector, where they ﬁnd jobs more rapidly. This realloca-
tion of jobseekers from the private to the public sector increases the share s (as appears in (19)),
and shifts the labor supply curve ns(q;s) to the right. The crowding-out of private-sector jobs by
public-sector jobs is mitigated by the labor supply shift.
Proposition 4 establishes that the ﬁscal multiplier has the same properties as in the basic model
as long as it is easier to ﬁnd jobs in the public sector than in the private sector (which implies that
wages are lower in the public sector than in the private sector):
PROPOSITION 4 (Multiplier with public-sector wages). Assume that y  1.
(a) ¶n=¶g < 1. Under Assumption 3, ¶n=¶g > 0 such that l > 0.
24(b) Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, d[¶n=¶g]=da < 0 such that dl=da < 0.
The proof of the proposition is somewhat different to that of Proposition 1. The marginal effect
























instead of (11). This expression takes into account the shift in labor supply ns(q;s) when the share
s increases after an increase dg > 0 in public employment. The proof characterizes ¶ns=¶s and
¶s=¶g before characterizing the multiplier l using the expression above for ¶n=¶g.
6 Calibration
This section calibrates the model with US data to illustrate numerically the cyclical ﬂuctuations of
the ﬁscal multiplier. While these simulations are too simple to estimate quantitatively the effects of
actual policy interventions, they illustrate how much the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy varies over
the business cycle, and how the effectiveness is inﬂuenced by various features of the model. I also
compare the outcome of the simulations with some empirical estimates of the ﬁscal multiplier.
I calibrate all parameters at a weekly frequency as summarized in Table 1. I calibrate as many
parameters as possible directly from micro-evidence and macro-data for the December 2000–June
2010 period. Following Michaillat [forthcoming], I set d = 0:999, s = 0:0094, r = 0:32w, and
g = 0:7. Following Landais et al. [2010], I set h = 0:7, n = 1, and r = 65%. Following common
practice, I set a = 0:66. I calibrate z to the average share of public employment in total em-
ployment in the seasonally-adjusted, monthly data from the Current Employment Survey (CES)
collected by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS). Public employment is the employment level in
the government super sector. Total employment is the employment level in the total nonfarm super
sector. I ﬁnd z = 0:16. I calibrate the remaining parameters by matching the steady-state values
of variables in the model to the average of their empirical counterpart. I normalize steady-state
technology a = 1, steady-state effort e = 1, steady-state public capital k = 1. Following Landais et
25Table 1: Parameter values in simulations (weekly frequency)
Interpretation Value Source
d Discount factor 0.999 Corresponds to 5% annually
s Separation rate 0.94% JOLTS, 2000–2010
h Unemp.-elasticity of matching 0.5 Petrongolo and Pissarides [2001]
r Recruiting cost 0.23 Barron et al. [1997], Silva and Toledo [2009]
z Share of public employment 0.16 CES, 2000–2010
g Real wage ﬂexibility 0.7 Haefke et al. [2008]
n Relative risk aversion 1 Chetty [2006]
r UI replacement rate 65% Pavoni and Violante [2007]
a Marginal returns to labor 0.66 Convention
wh Effectiveness of matching 0.19 Matches JOLTS, 2000–2010
w Steady-state real wage 0.70 Matches JOLTS, 2000–2010
With endogenous labor supply
k Elasticity of disutility of effort 2.1 Matches micro-elasticity of 0.9 [Meyer, 1990]
wz Disutility of effort 0.58 Matches effort of 1 for r = 65%
With public capital
x Productivity of public capital 0.05 Baxter and King [1993], Leeper et al. [2010]
b Depreciation rate of public capital 0.21% Baxter and King [1993], Leeper et al. [2010]
wp Relative public-sector productivity 0.71% Matches public capital of 1
With public-sector wages
y Job-ﬁnding rate ratio f(qg)=f(q) 2 Arbitrary policy choice
al. [2010], I set q = v=u = 0:47 and u = 5:9%, which implies n = 0:950, g = 0:157, l = 0:793, and
which allows me to recover wh = 0:19, w = 0:70, and r = 0:32w = 0:23.
Figure 3 plots the ﬁscal multiplier l times the gross domestic product (GDP) for a series of
technology levels, in a variety of models.18 A graph represents the reduction of unemployment
rate (measured in percentage points) achieved by spending 1% of GDP on public employment as
a function of the corresponding equilibrium unemployment rate. In the basic model (black solid
line), the ﬁscal multiplier is strongly countercyclical: it increases fourfold from 0.27 to 1.15 when
18GDP is deﬁned as ax(l)+wgg (ra)=q(q)(sn).
26the unemployment rate increases from 4% to 10%.
The other graphs describe ﬁscal multipliers in the three extensions of the basic model. All the
parameters calibrated in the basic model remain valid in these extensions. In the extension with
endogenous labor supply, I also set k = 2:1 and wz = 0:58, following Landais et al. [2010]. The
multiplier (red line with diamonds) is almost identical to that in the basic model. The reason is that
search effort e is quite inelastic with respect to q, such that the adjustment in search effort when
the government creates new jobs in the public sector is small. In the extension with public capital,
I calibrate the depreciation rate of public capital at 2:5% at quarterly frequency as Leeper et al.
[2010] and Baxter and King [1993], implying b = 0:21% at weekly frequency. I use (14) to set
the relative productivity of the public sector at wp = bk=ga = 0:71%. The productivity of public
capital x is critical to determine the size of the ﬁscal multiplier. A large literature studies the impact
of public capital on economic outcomes and social welfare, but no consensus emerges.19 Given the
lack of reliable estimates for x, I follow Baxter and King [1993] and Leeper et al. [2010] and plot
the multiplier for x = 0:05. The multiplier (blue dashed line) is always about 50% larger than in
the basic model because (1 a)+xa(1 z)=z = 0:50: the multiplier increases about fourfold
from 0.41to 1.68 when unemploymentincreases from 4% to10%. As arobustness check, Iplot the
multiplier for x = 0:1 (blue dashed line with dots): the multiplier is larger but it retains its cyclical
properties. Finally in the extension with public-sector wages, I plot the multiplier for an arbitrary
choices of y = f(qg)=f(q). I choose y = 2, which entails a share s = 9:0% of jobseekers in the
public sector. The value of y is greater than one so wages are lower (by about 2%) in the public
sector to make workers indifferent between searching in the two sectors. Compared to the basic
model, the multiplier (green dot-dashed line with circles) is higher but its cyclical ﬂuctuations are
milder: when unemployment increases from 4% to 10%, the multiplier increases only threefold
from 0.35 to 1.19. As a robustness check, I plot the multiplier for y = 5 (green dot-dashed line):
the multiplier is slightly larger but it retains its cyclical properties.
Quantitatively my calibration suggests that for the average US unemployment rate of 6%, the
multiplier could be in the 0.6–1.4 range, depending on the speciﬁcities of the model. How do these
19See for instance Aschauer [1989], Garcia-Mil` a and McGuire [1992], Holtz-Eakin [1993], Evans and Karras
[1994], and Nadiri and Mamuneas [1994].

































Figure 3: Fluctuations of the ﬁscal multiplier over the business cycle
Notes: The graphs represent a measure of the ﬁscal multiplier: the reduction of unemployment rate (measured in
percentage points) achieved by spending 1% of GDP on public employment. Calibration is in Table 1. Multipliers are
computed using expressions collected in Section C in the Appendix.
values match empirical estimates? Monacelli et al. [2010] use a structural vector autoregression
(SVAR) framework to estimate the ﬁscal multiplier in the US for the 1954–2006 period. They
ﬁnd that an increase in government spending on goods and services by 1% of GDP increases the
employment rate by 0.6 percentage point at the peak, which implies a multiplier of 0.6. Using
a SVAR with alternative identiﬁcation restrictions in US data for the 1970–2008 period, Pappa
[2010] ﬁnds that an increase in government spending on public employment by 1% of GDP in-
creases the employment rate by 1.4 percentage point at the peak, which implies a multiplier of
281.4.20 These empirical estimates fall in the range suggested by my simulations.21
My calibration also suggests that when the unemployment rate is 10% the ﬁscal multiplier is
three to four times higher than when the unemployment rate is 4%. Do we ﬁnd empirical evidence
that the ﬁscal multiplier is strongly countercyclical? Unfortunately empirical evidence about the
behavior of ﬁscal multipliers over the business cycle is still scarce, because empirical studies do
not usually account for the state of the economy when ﬁscal measures are enacted [Parker, 2011].
While more empirical work is required to reach a consensus about the effects of ﬁscal policies over
the business cycle, recent studies suggest that ﬁscal multipliers may indeed be countercyclical. For
instance using a regime-switching SVAR model in US data for the 1947–2009 period, Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko [2010] ﬁnd that in recessions ﬁscal multipliers are at least twice as large than
in expansions. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko [2011] conﬁrm these results using data for a large
set of OECD countries and allowing the multiplier to vary smoothly with the state of the economy.
Holden and Sparrman [2011] also investigate empirically the effect of government spending on
unemployment in a large set OECD countries for the 1960–2007 period. They conﬁrm that higher
government spending leads to lower unemployment, and that the effect is greater in recessions. At
the state level in the US, Nakamura and Steinsson [2011] investigate the increase in employment
following government spending during military build-ups. They ﬁnd that in high-unemployment
periods the increase is roughly twice larger than in low-unemployment periods. The estimated
increases of the ﬁscal multiplier between low-unemployment and high-unemployment regimes are
consistent with my simulations: in the basic model, the multiplier increases twofold from 0.5
to 1 when the unemployment rate increases from 5% (low-unemployment regime) to 8% (high-
unemployment regime); in the extensions, the multiplier increases are commensurable.
20Pappa [2010] ﬁnds that a 1% increase in government spending on public employment induces a 0.15% increase in
employment at the peak. I translated her results using the facts that on average in the US over the 1970–2008 period,
the employment rate is 94% and the spending on public employment is 10% of GDP.
21The SVAR methodology estimates the average ﬁscal multiplier over all possible economic states. Accordingly, I
compare the SVAR estimates with the ﬁscal multiplier in my model at the average US unemployment rate of 6%.
297 Discussion
During the Great Depression, the Roosevelt administration was concerned that public jobs newly
created as part the New Deal might make it more difﬁcult for private ﬁrms to hire workers by taking
away job applicants [Neumann et al., 2010]. The paper directly addresses this practical concern
by proving that in recessions the crowding out of private jobs by public jobs is much weaker than
in expansions. The paper also suggests that the Roosevelt administration responded appropriately
by hiring workers as part of large infrastructure projects, and by paying relief-job wages typically
well below private-sector wages.
Besides its practical implications, the paper provides a theoretical foundation for the critique
in Parker [2011] that most available estimates of the ﬁscal multiplier do not apply in recessions.
In the calibrated model, recessionary multipliers are much higher than average multipliers: in the
basic model the multiplier is 1.15 when unemployment is 10%, although it is only 0.70 when un-
employment is at its average level of 6%. As pointed out by Parker [2011], most empirical studies
estimating ﬁscal multipliers do not control for the economic conditions when ﬁscal policies are
implemented; and most macroeconomic studies estimate ﬁscal multipliers by computing impulse
response functions in models linearized around their steady state. The resulting estimates are only
valid in average economic conditions. For example, these methods would broadly yield a multi-
plier of 0.70 in my model. This value does not convey much useful information to policymakers
who ponder whether enacting a ﬁscal stimulus in a recession, because the recessionary multiplier
is 1.15 and not 0.70.22
22The countercyclicality of the ﬁscal multiplier is quite general. It does not only hold when ﬁscal policy takes
the form of public employment: for instance, Proposition A2 in the Appendix shows that the ﬁscal multiplier is also
countercyclical when ﬁscal policy takes the form of a wage subsidy. For two speciﬁc reasons, however, I am more
hesitant about the effectiveness of a wage subsidy than about the effectiveness of public employment. First, a wage
subsidy may not be effective if demand shocks drive ﬂuctuations. Assume that ﬁrms face a downward-sloping goods
demand, that prices are completely sticky in the short run, and that demand falls. In that case ﬁrm’s labor demand is
fully determined by goods demand and production function so that a wage subsidy is ineffective. Second, the impact
of a wage subsidy depends on the bargaining mechanism between ﬁrm and workers. If workers capture all wage
subsidy transferred by the government to ﬁrms, then the post-tax wage faced by ﬁrms is unaffected by the subsidy,
and the subsidy is completely ineffective. On the contrary, the effectiveness of public employment is to the source
of job rationing, the source of aggregate ﬂuctuations, and the wage-setting mechanism (as long as the creation of
public-sector jobs does not lead to drastic increases in private-sector wages).
30Several restrictions, however, limit the degree to which the theory moves us toward a full un-
derstanding of the role for ﬁscal policy in recessions. A weakness that the theory shares with other
macroeconomic models relying on rigid wages is that wages adhere to an exogenous wage sched-
ule. As discussed in Michaillat [forthcoming], this rigid schedule is theoretically valid because
any privately efﬁcient wage is a possible Nash equilibrium; and it is empirically valid because it is
calibrated with the estimate of wage rigidity obtained by Haefke et al. [2008] using micro-data on
wages for new hires. But this wage does not resolve the indeterminacy of the outcome of wage set-
ting, and as such it cannot capture the inﬂuence of ﬁscal policy on private-sector wages. If private-
sector wages, and thus private labor demand, respond markedly to conditions on public-sector jobs
as in Quadrini and Trigari [2007] and Gomes [2010], the ﬁscal multiplier should be amended to
capture this inﬂuence. Future research should design a richer yet tractable wage-setting mecha-
nism explaining the wage rigidity observed in the data to improve our understanding of the role
for ﬁscal policy. Some papers offer a promising start on this research agenda: Hall and Milgrom
[2008] and Menzio [2005] propose theories of wage rigidity based on bargaining; Rudanko [2009]
describes wage rigidity as the result from implicit contracts between ﬁrm and workers; an Elsby
[2009] models wage rigidity as the result of workers’ loss-aversion.
Another limitation that the model shares with most equilibrium unemployment models is that
the only source of recessions is a technology shock. In reality, this is not plausible. The contraction
experienced after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is not apparently caused by a collapse of productivity:
in the US, the BLS reports that while multifactor productivity in the private non-farm business
sector fell in 2008, it was constant in 2009 and it rose sharply during 2010. Future work should
explore how other shocks inﬂuence the effectiveness of ﬁscal policy. Demand shocks and ﬁnan-
cial shocks are promising candidates [Barnichon, 2010; Christiano et al., 2007]. Existing papers
already examine the inﬂuence of non-technology shocks in macroeconomic models of equilibrium
unemployment: a monetary policy shock in Walsh [2003] and Trigari [2009]; shocks to mone-
tary policy, preferences, investment, government spending, price markup, and workers’ bargaining
power in Gertler et al. [2008]. I do not anticipate that alternative shocks would change the results
as long as jobs are rationed in recessions, because the behavior of the multiplier does not rely on
31the source of the shock but on labor market conditions in recessions.
To conclude, although my analysis builds on a dynamic model, it focuses on its steady state.
It would be instructive to study the role for ﬁscal policy in a stochastic environment. A difﬁculty
arising in a stochastic environment is that there is no standard method to study, analytically or
numerically, ﬁscal multipliers over the business cycle. Numerical estimates of the ﬁscal multiplier
are usually obtained by computing impulse response functions after a government spending shock
in a macroeconomic model log-linearized around its deterministic steady state. The resulting mul-
tiplier is only valid around the steady state and not in recessions. Studying ﬁscal multipliers over
the business cycle would require new numerical methods. In presence of stochastic ﬂuctuations,
it would be interesting to explore various avenues: the ﬁnancing of government spending using
debt in recessions; investment and accumulation of private capital; and borrowing and saving by
workers such that workers are able to substitute consumption intertemporally.23
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35Appendix – NOT FOR PUBLICATION
A Some Derivations
A.1 Extension: endogenous labor supply






(1 ut)v((1 tt)w)+ut [z(et)+v(bt w)+et  f(qt)[v((1 tt)w) v(bt w)]]
+At 
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t is the probability to be employed in period t, ut  1 (1 s)ns
t 1 is the probability of
being unemployed at the beginning of period t, and fAtg are Lagrange multipliers. The ﬁrst-order




The ﬁrst-order condition with respect to the probability of being employed ns
t yields:
At = d(1 s)fz(et+1)+[At+1+[v((1 tt+1)w) v(bt+1w)]][1 et+1 f(qt+1)]g










When n = 1, l’Hospital’s rule implies that v((1 tt)w) v(bt w) = ln((1 tt)=bt) = ln(1=r).
With the isoelastic disutility of effort, et+1 z0(et+1) = (1+k)z(et+1). Thus the optimal effort
function therefore satisﬁes equation (12).
A.2 Extension: public-sector wages
LEMMA A1. In steady state, y  f(qg)=f(q)  1 if and only if p  wg=w  1.
Proof. Let Ut denote the present discounted value of unemployment (whether the unemployed
worker searches for a job in the public or private sector). Let W
g
t denote the present discounted
value of employment in the public sector. Let Wt denote the present discounted value of employ-






















In steady state, these values are constant over time: Ut =U, W
g
t =W g, Wt =W. Hence:
y[W g [v(bw)+dU]] =W  [v(bw)+dU] (A1)




Thereforep1,W g W (using(A2), sinceutilityv()isincreasing),W g [v(bw)+dU]
W  [v(bw)+dU] > 0 (since 1 > r, W >U which imposes W > [v(bw)+dU] because U
is a convex combination of W and [v(bw)+dU]) , y  1 (using (A1)).
To recover the wage premium p from y and q, notice that (after some algebra) ˆ U  U=v((1 




[1 d(1 y f(q))] 0  y f(q) 0
[1 d(1  f(q))]  f(q) 0 0
 ds [1 d(1 s)] 0 0



























The matrix on the left-hand side is invertible. Given f(q) and y, this linear system uniquely
pins down p1 n and the wage premium p. To keep the ratio y = f(qg)=f(q) constant, the wage
premium needs to be adjusted over the business cycle.
B Proofs
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Under Assumption 2, wages fwtg
+¥
t=0 are determined using the generalized Nash solution to the
bargaining problem faced by a ﬁrm-worker pair. Et denotes the value of being employed, and Ut
the value of being unemployed (both are evaluated after the matching process):
Et = v((1 tt)wt)+d[f1 s(1  f(qt+1))gEt+1+s(1  f(qt+1))Ut+1]
Ut = v(bt wt)+d[(1  f(qt+1))Ut+1+ f(qt+1)Et+1]:
37These continuation values are the sum of current payoffs, plus discounted continuation values.
Combining both conditions yields the worker’s surplus Wt from a relationship with a ﬁrm:
Wt =Et  Ut = [v((1 tt)wt) v(bt wt)]+d(1 s)[1  f(qt+1)]Wt+1: (A3)
Since workers consume exactly the post-tax wage (1 tt)wt in the current period, a wage brings
utility v((1 tt)wt) to the employed worker in the current period and
dWt
dwt
= (1 tt)v0((1 tt)wt) = (1 tt)1 nv0(wt):
In equilibrium the ﬁrm’s surplus from an established relationship is simply given by the hiring
cost since a ﬁrm can immediately replace a worker at that cost during the matching period: Ft =
r a=q(qt). Assume that wages are continually renegotiated. Then the wage bargained in the
current period only inﬂuences payoffs in the current period. Accordingly, since the ﬁrm’s utility is
simply its proﬁts, a wage wt brings a utility  wt to the ﬁrm (or its owners) and dFt=dwt =  1.
The generalized Nash solution to the bargaining problem faced by a ﬁrm-worker pair is the
wage wt that maximizes
Wt(wt)cFt(wt)1 c;
where c is the worker’s bargaining power. The ﬁrst-order condition of the maximization problem








Plugging this relationship into the recursive equation (A3) for the worker’s surplus Wt, and using
the above expressions for Ft and dWt=dwt, I obtain the relationship between equilibrium variables

























































38Combining this expression for w=a with the ﬁrm’s proﬁt-maximization condition (2) yields an
expression for tightness q as a function of the parameters of the model only (in particular, q does
not depend on technology a).
B.2 Proof of Proposition 1.
Part 1. In a steady state parameterized by technology a and public employment g, the key equi-











































ed is normalized to be positive. The effect of public employment g on aggregate employment n















Part 2. To determine how the multiplier l ﬂuctuates over the business cycle, I examine the
tightness-elasticities es and ed. Labor supply (3) implies an equilibrium relationship between elas-
ticity es and unemployment u:
es = (1 h)u: (A8)
The tightness-elasticity of labor supply is countercyclical because unemployment is countercycli-
cal. Next, I calculate the tightness-elasticity ed. Equation (2) implies that the elasticity el
q of private

















W measure the share of the marginal recruiting costs in the marginal cost of labor. Aggregate labor






LEMMA A2. Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, equilibrium variables satisfy: dq=da>0; dn=da>
0; dl=da > 0; du=da < 0.

















Under Assumptions 3 and 4, ¶ld=¶q < 0; ¶ld=¶a > 0. Under Assumption 5, equilibrium condi-







































Thus dq=da > 0. I conclude by using ¶ns=¶q > 0 and noting that in equilibrium n = ns(q), u =
1 (1 s)n, and l = (1 z)n.
Using Lemma A2, the facts that q0(q) < 0 and d[w=a]=da < 0, and deﬁnition (A9): dW=da >
0. Using Lemma A2 and relations (A8) and (A10): ded=da > 0 and des=da < 0. In addition,
¶nd=¶g = 1. Hence (A7) implies that d[¶n=¶g]=da < 0. The marginal cost of public employment
ismc=w+[1 d(1 s)]ra=q(q). UsingLemmaA2, andthefactsthatq0(q)<0andw0(a)>0:
dmc=da > 0. Since l = (¶n=¶g)=mc: dl=da < 0.
40B.3 Proof of Proposition 2.
The proof of Proposition 1 remains mostly valid. The proof of Part 1 is unaltered. There are
slight differences in the proof of Part 2. A ﬁrst difference is that there is an additional equilibrium
variable: search effort e.
LEMMA A3. Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, equilibrium variables satisfy: dq=da>0; de=da>
0; dn=da > 0; dl=da > 0; du=da < 0.
Proof. Effort supply es(q), given by (12), and labor supply, given by (13), satisfy: ¶es=¶q >
0; ¶ns=¶q > 0; ¶ns=¶e > 0. Under Assumptions 3 and 4, private labor demand ld(q;a), given




































Thus dq=da > 0. I conclude by using ¶es=¶q > 0; ¶ns=¶q > 0; ¶ns=¶e > 0 and noting that in
equilibrium e = es(q), n = ns(e;q), u = 1 (1 s)n, and l = (1 z)n.
Equilibrium variable behave as in the basic model. In addition, effort e is procyclical.
A second difference is that the elasticity es of labor supply is affected by the presence of endoge-
nous labor supply: search effort e responds to a change in tightness q. I log-linearize the worker’s
optimality condition (12) to obtain the effect of a marginal change in dg in public employment.
























































This elasticity is similar to that in the basic model: there is only an additional 1=L term. Using
deﬁnition (A11) and Lemma A3: dL=da > 0. Therefore it remains that des=da < 0. The rest of
the proof proceeds as the proof of Proposition 1.
B.4 Proof of Proposition 3.
The proof of Part 1 is unaltered. There are slight differences in the proof of Part 2. A ﬁrst dif-
ference is that equilibrium labor demand is affected by the introduction of public capital. Under


























While the expression for equilibrium private labor demand ld is different here, its properties remain
the same as in the basic model: ld(q;a) is increasing in a, decreasing in q. Thus the results from
Lemma A2 remain valid: the qualitative behavior of equilibrium variables when technology varies
is unchanged.
A second difference is that public employment g now inﬂuences private labor demand ld; thus
I need to re-calculate ¶nd=¶g = 1+¶ld=¶g 6= 1. Using the implicit deﬁnition (15) of private la-
bor demand ld, consider the effect dld of a marginal change dg in public employment, keeping
tightness q constant:



















Since ¶nd=¶g remains a function of parameters only, the proof from Proposition 1 carries through.
B.5 Proof of Proposition 4.
Part 1. In steady state parameterized by technology a and public employment g, the key equilib-
rium condition is the labor market clearing condition:
ns(q;s) = nd(q;a;g):
















































where the elasticities es and ed of labor supply and labor demand are deﬁned by (A5) and (A6). It

















I start from the share of unemployed workers in the public sector given by (19), and I consider a
small deviation dg in public employment:









































where I used the balance of ﬂows in and out of public employment (17), and the deﬁnitions f(q)=


















































Part 2. I assume y  1. Equation (19) implies that in equilibrium the share s of public unem-
ployment satisﬁes s = [1+y(1 z)=z]
 1. In equilibrium s remains constant over the business
cycle: it does not depend on technology a. Labor supply ns(q) is deﬁned by (20). ¶ns=¶q > 0
because 1+s(y 1)  0 for all s  0. Therefore the results from Lemma A2 also apply in
this extension. As in the basic model, the elasticity ed of labor demand satisﬁes (A10), and the
elasticity es of labor demand satisﬁes (A8). Therefore, ded=da > 0, des=da < 0, du=da < 0. Us-
ing (A14), I conclude that d[¶l=¶g]=da > 0 and d[¶n=¶g]=da > 0 (note that ¶l=¶g < 0). The
marginal cost of public employment is now mc = pw+[1 d(1 s)]r=q(q), but its cyclicality
remains unchanged: dmc=da > 0. Therefore dl=da < 0.
C Expressions for the ﬁscal multiplier
HereIcollectresultsderivedinSectionB.Letmc=(w=a)+[1 d(1 s)]r=q(q)bethemarginal



























































where the marginal cost is mc=p(w=a)+[1 d(1 s)]r=q(q) since public-sector wages differ
from private-sector wages.
44D Efﬁcient Allocation





t=0 for public and private employment; labor
market tightness; consumption in private jobs, public jobs, and unemployment; and output of
private and public good. A feasible allocation is an allocation that satisﬁes (a) the production
constraint (1) for the private good; (b) a production constraint (4) for the public good; (c) the














and (d) the law of motion for aggregate employment (1 s)nt 1+ut f(qt)=nt, where I simplify
notations by using total employment nt = lt +gt, unemployment ut = 1 (1 s)nt 1, and new




















t = ct. Proposition A1 establishes that the efﬁcient allocation is invariant to
technology:
PROPOSITION A1. In the steady-state efﬁcient allocation, labor market variables g, l, q and
ratios c=a, y=a, p=a are independent of technology a.
Proof. In steady state, the resource and production constraints imply that the ratios of private
consumption, private output, and public output to technology are only function of labor market
variables: c=a = x(l) [r=q(q)]sn, y=a = x(l), p=a = wp x(g). Therefore, these ratios are
independent of technology a if labor market variables are.
Labor market variables fg;l;qg in the efﬁcient allocation are characterized by three equations,
which I present below. When the labor market is in steady state, employments g and l, and labor





To derive the two other relationships, I derive ﬁrst-order conditions of the planner’s problem with
respect to fct;qt;nt;lt;gtg+¥
















t [(1 s)(1  f(qt))nt 1+ f(qt) nt]+µ3







































t = wvv0(pt)awpx0(gt): (A20)
Since hiring a worker has the same marginal cost in the private and public sector, the marginal
beneﬁt from a worker must be equal in both sectors. In steady state, combining the ﬁrst-order

















In particular, it is always optimal to employ some workers in the public sector as long as the public
good is valuable (wv > 0) and the government is productive (wp > 0). The ratios p=a and c=a are
only function of labor market variables, so p=c is only a function of labor market variables, so
the efﬁcient ratio of public to private employment g=l is only function of labor market variables.
The trade-off between private and public employment remains unchanged when technology falls
because the productivities of public and private jobs fall in concert.












































This relationship says that the marginal beneﬁt from having workers search for jobs must equal the
marginalbeneﬁtfromhavingthemproducegoods. Thesystemofthreeequationsf (A15); (A21); (A22)g,
and the efﬁcient allocation fg;l;qg, are independent of technology a.
46E Generalization to Other Fiscal Policies
To show how the framework and results of Section 4 extend to other ﬁscal policies, I study the
effect of government spending on a wage subsidy T. If pre-tax wages are rigid (as assumed in this
paper), a wage subsidy paid to ﬁrms, implementable as a payroll tax cut on the ﬁrm side, necessar-
ily reduces unemployment by reducing the marginal cost of labor. All equilibrium conditions of









lT is the increase in employment achieved by spending one unit of private good on a wage subsidy.
mcT = wl is the per-period marginal cost of a wage subsidy. Since a wage subsidy stimulates ag-













where equations (A8) and (A10) from the model with public employment relating elasticities es

















where mc = (1 T)(w=a)+[1 d(1 s)]r=q(q) is the marginal cost of hiring a worker. A
constant wage subsidy does not modify the cyclicality of equilibrium variables. Thus the cyclical
ﬂuctuations of the wage-subsidy multiplier lT are identical to those of the public-employment
multiplier l. Proposition A2 establishes that the wage-subsidy multiplier lT is countercyclical:
PROPOSITION A2 (Wage-subsidy multiplier). Under Assumptions 3, 4, and 5, dlT=da < 0.
Proof. Identical to the proof of Part 2 of Proposition 1.
A wage subsidy reduces the marginal cost of labor, which leads ﬁrms to increase employment;
higher aggregate employment increases tightness and recruiting costs until a new equilibrium is
reached, at which point the new marginal cost of labor equals the marginal product of labor. In
recessions when jobs are rationed, recruiting costs are low and do not vary much with employment
so a wage subsidy triggers a large increase in employment; in expansions, recruiting costs are
high and increase rapidly with employment so a wage subsidy only achieves a small increase in
employment; thus, a wage subsidy is more effective in recessions.
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